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Minnesota Supreme Court Decisions released June-July, 2010
Real Property
Kennedy v. Pepin Township of Wabasha County, ___ N.W.2d ___ (Minn. July 15, 2010) (A08-1291)
Owner of landlocked parcel petitioned for cartway pursuant to Minn. Stat. § 164.08. Parcel consisted of 20 acres steeply sloped bluff, and 5 buildable acres on top of bluff. Township granted cartway to lower 20 acre parcel, and landowner appealed. The Supreme Court, Meyer, J., held that this did not provide "meaningful access", and that landowner was entitled to access to the "usable" portion of land. The Supreme Court remanded for township to determine route, reversing the Court of Appeals which had established a location for the cartway.
Sampair v. Village of Birchwood, ___ N.W.2d ___ (Minn. July 8, 2010) (A08-1494, A08-1505)
Landowners of property subject to easements applied for Torrens title in 2007. Minn. Stat. § 541.023 required easement owners to record, within 40 years of creation of easement, notice of claim. In the absence of such notice, the easement is conclusively presumed to be abandoned. Notice had not been filed in this case.
The holders of the easement relied on language in the statute providing an exception for those in possession.
The Supreme Court, Gildea, C.J., held that to fall within this exception, the possession by the easement holder must be sufficient to put a prudent person on notice of the asserted interest. To the extent inconsistent, the Court overruled Caroga Realty Co. v. Tapper, 274 Minn. 164, 143 N.W.2d 215 (1966).
The Court further held that to establish the exception, the possession must have begun "at the deadline for filing notice under the MTA--i.e., within 40 years of when the property interest was created--and continuing through the filing of the relevant action regarding ownership." The burden of proof is upon the holder of the easement.
Krummenacher v. City of Minnetonka, ___ N.W.2d ___ (Minn. June 24, 2010)(A08-1988)
Property owner was granted variance to expand nonconforming garage on her property. Neighbor, dissatisfied with this action, appealed to the City Council, which affirmed the Planning Commision's determination. Both the District Court and the Court of Appeals affirmed.
The Supreme Court, Gildea, J., reversed and remanded, holding that the lower courts failed to apply the correct standard, namely, that the variance should be granted only if "the property in question cannot be put to reasonable use" without the variance. The case was remanded for application of the correct standard.
Premier Bank v. Becker Development, LLC, ___ N.W.2d ___ (Minn. July 22, 2010) (A08-1252, A08-1700).
Mortgagee brought forclosure action against development project, consisting of 59 lots, three of which contained model homes. Lien claimant had filed a blanket lien pursuant to Minn. Stat. § 514.09, which encumbered the entire 59 lot project, but sought to foreclose full value of lien against three model-home lots.
The Supreme Court, Dietzen, J., held that the lien must be enforced as one lien against the whole area improved. The lien against the three model-home lots is limited to the pro-rata amount of the lien.
Citizens State Bank v. Raven Trading Partners, Inc., ___ N.W.2d ___ (Minn. July 22, 2010) (A08-1560)
On February 16, borrower entered into loan and mortgage with Mortgagee #1, proceeds of which were used to satisfy two prior mortgages. Mortgage was sent to county recorder on February 21, but was returned on March 14 due to improper mortgage registration tax amount. Mortgage #1 was re-submitted on April 20, and was recorded on May 9.
In the meantime, on April 7, borrower executed mortgage with Mortgagee #2. Mortgage #2 referenced the two prior mortgages (which had been satisfied), but did not reference Mortgage #1. Mortgage #2 was recorded on April 29.
Mortgage #1 filed complaint in district court alleging that it was equitably subrogated to the positions of the two prior mortgages, since its loan was used to satisfy those mortgages.
The Supreme Court, G. Barry Anderson, J., held that Mortgagee #1 was not entitled to equitable subrogation, and that Mortgagee #2 was entitled to priority under recording statute. Mortgagee #1's failure to act for 38 days after return by recorder's office was not a justifiable or excusable mistake of fact.
Justices Page and P.H. Anderson would have deferred to the discretion of the trial court, which had concluded that the delay was a justifiable or excusable mistake of fact, and would have allowed eqitable subrogation.
Eagan Economic Development Authority v. U-Haul Company of Minnesota, ___ N.W.2d ___ (Minn. July 29, 2010)(A08-767)
In this eminent domain action, the court considered a redevelopment plan which it called "poorly drafted" in that the "imprecise language" made interpretation "challenging." Property owners argued that the plan required the Economic Development Authority to have a binding defelopment agreement before it could condemn property. The Supreme Court, Paul H. Anderson, J., held that a prior binding agreement was not necessary in this circumstance.
The Supreme Court remanded to the Court of Appeals for consideration of property owners' additional objections, such that the use of the property was not a public use.
Johnson v. Cook County, ___ N.W.2d ___ (Minn. July 29, 2010)(A08-1501).
Property owner made zoning request in 2001, which was denied by Board of County Commissioners. Board failed to state reasons for denial, in writing, as required by Minn. Stat. § 15.99, subd. 2. Landowner brought declaratory action in 2006 asserting that the request had thereby been automatically approved.
The Supreme Court, , J., reversing the Court of Appeals, held that County's failure to provide reasons did not constitute automatic approval of request under statute.
Attorneys
Kidwell v. Sybaritic, Inc., ___ N.W.2d ___ (Minn. June 24, 2010) (A07-584 A07-788)
Plaintiff former in-house general counsel of defendant, brought action under whistleblower statute, Minn. Stat. § 181.932 (2008), alleging that his termination was the result of his reporting to management concerns about failure to investigate dishonest salespeople, unauthorized practice of medicine, and tax evasion. Jury returned verdict in favor of plaintiff.
The plurality opinion authored by Justice Gildea first held that the statute did not contain a "job duties exception" that would categorically bar employees (such as in-house counsel) whose job is to report suspected illegality from bringing a claim under the statute. However, those job duties are relevant in determining whether the employee was engaging in protected conduct under the statute, or whether he was instead engaging in his job duties.
In this case, however, the employee was merely carrying out his job duties, namely, rendering a legal opinion. Therefore, he was not engaging in protected conduct under the statute.
Chief Justice Magnuson concurred in the result, but would have barred the claim since the plaintiff had violated his fiduciary duty to the defendant, apparently due to the fact that plaintiff had sent a copy of an e-mail to his father, a retired businessman.
Justices P.H. Anderson, Meyer, and Page, dissented and would have affirmed.
In re Aitken, ___ N.W.2d ___ (Minn. July 29, 2010)(A09-1066).
Attorney, assistant public defender, forged client's signature on plea petition, and submitted petition to court without client's knowledge or consent. The Supreme Court, Per Curiam, suspended attorney for 90 days.
In Re Bunch, ___ N.W.2d ___ (Minn. July 2, 2010) (A10-1023).
Attorney was sued in conciliation court by two former tenants. Attorney filed affidavit attesting that he had counterclaim in excess of jurisdictional limits, and intended to commence action within 30 days. Claim was not filed until five years later, and did not exceed jurisdictional limits of conciliation court.
Attorney and Director stipulated to public reprimand.
In Re Mayne, ___ N.W.2d ___ (Minn. June 10, 2010)(A08-1522)
Attorney was convicted of felony, financial exploitation of vulnerable adult, after taking approximately $60,000 from father's bank accounts for her personal use, and failing to pay approximately $45,000 in bills to father's care facilities.
Referee recommended indefinite suspension, with leave to apply for reinstatement in 2018.
The Supreme Court, Per Curiam, found that attorney failed to prove mitigating factors by clear and convincing evidence, and disbarred attorney.
In re Waite, ___ N.W.2d ___ (Minn. June 3, 2010)(A08-2097).
Attorney failed to timely file state and federal tax returns for as many as twelve years, acted incopetently and without proper diligence, failed to obey court directives, and failed to properly supervise non-lawyer assistant. The Supreme Court, Per Curiam, indefinitely suspended attorney, with no right to petition for reinstatement for a minimum of five months.
In Re Gant, ___ N.W.2d ___ (Minn. June 8, 2010)(A09-1998).
Attorney was accused of bringing defamation action with no basis in law or fact. Director and Attorney stipulated to public reprimand.
In re DeSmidt, ___ N.W.2d ___ (Minn. June 3, 2010)(A10-545).
Attorney and Director stipulated to public reprimand and two years of supervised probation for: failure to deposit advance fee payments into trust account, failing to keep clients reasonably informed and comply with requests for information, and abandoning appeal of client by deliberately failing to file brief.
Evidence
State v. Stone, ___ N.W.2d ___ (Minn. June 30, 2010) (A08-769)
Trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting audio recording of police interview with witness as recorded recollection under Minn. R. Evid. 803(5), which requires that the witness "now has insufficient recollection to testify fully and accurately." Exception applies even though the witness "has some memory of a prior event." (Emphasis in original.)
Criminal Law and Procedure
State v. Finnegan, ___ N.W.2d ___ (Minn. June 30, 2010) (A08-0777).
Defendant failed to appear on second day of trial. Defendant's mother had called to report that defendant was in bed an unresponsive, and trial court sent officers to go get Mr. Finnegan, get some proper clothes on him, and get him to this courtroom as soon as possible."
The officer reported that defendant's "condition was beyond an officer's ability" and that an abulance had been sent to deal with the likely overdose. The trial court held that the defendant's "conduct of choosing to overdose or whatever he did to make himself in a stupor waived his right to be present" and continued the trial in the defendant's absence.
The Supreme Court, Gildea, J., held that this was not clearly erroneous, and affirmed the trial court's denial of post-conviction relief.
Justices Anderson, Page, and Meyer dissented.
State v. Chavarria-Cruz, ___ N.W.2d ___ (Minn. June 30, 2010) (A08-1036)
During questioning, defendant stated: "That's not . . . I'm, I'm cooperating here, talking to you has been like you know, I think I need lawyer . . ."
Questioning continued past this point. The investigator testified that the defendant was very soft-spoken and had a pronounced accent, and that he did not recall the defendant using the word "lawyer". He conceded upon hearing the recording however, that the defendant had used the word "lawyer".
The District Court and Court of Appeals proceeded on the basis that the officer had not heard the request for a lawyer, and held that it was proper to admit the following statement.
The Supreme Court, Magnuson, C.J., applied an objective standard of whether a "reasonable police officer" would have heard the confession, noting that "[o]fficers conducting investigations have a strong interest in facilitating effective communication in order to gather information."
The Court further held that the error was not harmless, and remanded for new trial.
State v. Askland, ___ N.W.2d ___ (Minn. June 24, 2010) (A08-1630)
Defendant in underlying criminal action for failure to pay child support was free on $10,000 bond, but failed to appear. Bondsman located defendant and returned him to court, but only after bond was forfeited, and funds improperly paid to mother of defendant's child.
The Supreme Court, Gildea, J., held that bondsman was entitled to reinstatement of bond and refund, less 10% penalty, notwithstanding prejudice to state arising out of improper payment of funds to child's mother, rather than to state treasury.
State v. Anderson, ___ N.W.2d ___ (Minn. June 30,2010) (A08-1521)
Affirming a conviction for first-degree murder, the Supreme Court, Anderson, G.B., J., held: Certain alleged omissions and misrepresentations in search warrant application were not material; circumstantial evidence was sufficient to convict; there was no violation of defendant's right to counsel when investigators stopped listening to phone calls from jail as soon as the realized that calls were to an attorney.
Justices Page, Meyer, and P.H. Anderson added concurring opinions regarding standard of review for the sufficiency of the evidence.
State v. Prtine, ___ N.W.2d ___ (Minn. June 30, 2010) (A09-702)
Remanding a conviction for first-degree felony murder, the Supreme Court, Page, J., held:
It was error to refuse to strike juror who stated she was more inclined to credit testimony of police witnesses, but error was harmless when defendant use peremptory strike on that juror;
It was error for medical examiner to testify that assailant was "doing their best to kill this person," "purposely trying to kill them," and wanted to show they were in charge by maybe trying to cut off the victim's head; however, error was harmless.
Various unobjected-to prosecutorial misconduct did not constitute plain error to warrant reversal.
It was error for the court to suggest the order in which the jury should consider the charges, but the error was not prejudicial.
Defendant's trial attorney conceded the element of intent. Since the record was unclear, the case was remanded to the district court to determine whether the defendant had acquiesced in that concession.
Justices Gildea, Dietzen, and P.H. Anderson concurred in part and dissented in part.
Staunton v. State, ___ N.W.2d ___ (Minn. June 30, 2010)(A09-782).
Affirming a conviction for first-degree murder, the Supreme Court, Anderson, G.B., J., held that evidence was sufficient to convict and that appellant had failed to establish prejudice from his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.
Torts & Insurance
J.E.B. v. Danks, ___ N.W.2d ___ (Minn. July 22, 2010)(A08-2175).
Plaintiff brought defamation action, alleging that defendant had filed fals report of sexual abuse of child, and that defendant had spread false rumors to the same effect. Trial court granted summary judgment to defendant, holding that defendant was immune from suit under Reporting of Maltreatment of Minors Act, Minn. Stat. § 626.556.
The Supreme Court, Gildea, C.J., held:
1. Summary judgment was inappropriate, because there was evidence from which a jury could have inferred that defendant was motivated in part by personal spite. The court cited defendant's language regarding "unhappiness" that that plantiff had become "hostile and abusive to me", defendant's lack of personal knowledge, exagerated language in report to authorities, and delay in making report until after plantiff's attorney had sent cease and desist letter.
2. Statutory immunity protects only good faith reports to authorities, but does not grant immunity for disclosing potentially defamatory information to third parties. Therefore, defendant was not entitled to immunity for communications beyone the report made to an official agency.
Stewart v. Koenig, ___ N.W.2d ___ (Minn. June 10, 2010)(A08-1209)
Plaintiff bicyclist sued defendant motorist for injuries suffered from bicycle-car accident which occurred on state recreational trail. Defendant was driving on private driveway easement which crossed trail; plaintiff was bicycling on trail.
DNR regulation requires a "trail user" who is entering or crossing trail to yield right of way to users already on the trail. Plaintiff sought jury instruction stating that defendant had violated this regulation, and that this violation established negligence per se. Defendant argued that he was not a "trail user". Trial court agreed, and instead give common-law negligence instruction.
The Supreme Court, Dietzen, J., held that defendant was not a "trail user" for purpose of this regulation. Therefore, trial court did not err in failing to give requested instruction.
Swanson v. Brewster, ___ N.W.2d ___ (Minn. June 30, 2010)( A08-806).
Negotiated-discount amounts--amounts a plaintiff is billed by a medical provider but does not pay because the plaintiff's insurance provider negotiates a discount on the plaintiff's behalf--are "collateral sources" for purposes of the collateral-source statute, Minn. Stat. § 548.251 (2008).
Justices Meyer and Page dissented, taking the position that the amounts were not "payments" for purposes of the statute, since nobody had been paid.
Cargill, Inc., v. Ace American Insurance Co., ___ N.W.2d ___ (Minn. June 30, 2010) (A08-1082).
Cargill was sued in various environmental lawsuits in Oklahoma and Arkansas, for damages allegedly arising over a fifty year period. Cargill brought this declaratory judgment action in Minnesota, asserting that all insurers over that period of time had a duty to defend.
The Supreme Court, Anderson, J., held that court can order primary insurers who insure the same insured for the same risks, and whose policies are triggered for defense purposes, to be equally liable for the costs of defense based on equitable contribution. The Court further held that a primary insurer has an equitable right to seek contribution from any other insurer with a duty to defend.
This right to seek contribution is based upon equitable grounds, regardless of privity of contract between the insurers, overruling Iowa Nat'l Mut. Ins. v. Universal Underwriters Ins. Co., 276 Minn. 362, 150 N.W.2d 233 (1967).
Civil Procedure
Middle-Snake-Tamarac Rivers Watershed District v. Stengrim, ___ N.W.2d ___ (Minn. June 30, 2010) (A08-825)
Watershed district brought action to enforce settlement agreement arising out of earlier litigation involving flood management project. In settlement agreement, defendant had agreed to "address no further challenges."
Defendant moved to dismiss, pursuant to Minnesota's anti-SLAPP statutes, Minn. Stat. §§ 554.01-.05. Under that statute, the non-moving party (plaintiff) is required to show, by clear and convincing evidence, that the moving party is not immune from liability.
But despite this burden of proof, the Supreme Court held that the trial court must first make a preliminary determination about the applicability of the statute. Dismissal of the lawsuit was not appropriate because "[p]reexisting legal relationships, such as those based on a settlement agreement where a party waives certain rights, may legitimately limit a party's public participation. It would be illogical to read [the statute] as providing presumptive immunity to actions that a moving party may have contractually agreed to forgo or limit."
Lund v. Commissioner of Public Safety, ___ N.W.2d ___ (Minn. June 3, 2010)(A08-1408).
Driver's license was revoked under Implied Consent law, and district court sustained revocation. Driver successfully appealed to Court of Appeals, which reversed and remanded. Driver sought taxation of costs and disbursements under Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 139. Court of Appeals granted costs.
The Supreme Court, Page, J., reversed, and held that the State was not liable for costs and disbursements when acting, as here, in its soveriegn capacity, and not its proprietary capacity. While costs could be assessed in a tort case under Tort Claims Act, this is only because state is subject to tort liability as if it were a private person, which includes liability for costs and disbursements. The Tort Claims Act is not applicable in the case of the state acting in its sovereign capacity.
Workers' Compensation
Seehus v. Bor-Son Construction, Inc., ___ N.W.2d ___ (Minn. June 10, 2010)(A09-1388)
Workers' Compensation Judge apportioned responsibility for workers' injury as 50% each between two insurers, one of which was insolvent. Solvent insurer argued that Minnesota Insurance Guaranty Association (MIGA) was responsible for insolvent insurer's portion of claim.
The Supreme Court, Dietzen, J., held that MIGA was not liable for claim, and that solvent insurer was solely liable.
Copyright 2010, Richard P. Clem